The backup you have never tested is not a backup.
Ransomware groups target backups first, precisely because a working restore removes their leverage. We design backup and replication that is immutable, offsite, and — critically — restore-tested on a schedule so you know the recovery time before you need it.
A finger on the runbook
Close crop: one hand resting flat on an open spiral-bound runbook on a bare pale surface, a finger marking a step. Only the hand and the page. Soft light, shallow depth. Show process, not hardware.
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Everything below is in scope, not an upsell.
3-2-1-1-0 by design
Three copies, two media, one offsite, one immutable, zero restore errors. The last one is the part most people skip.Immutable copies
Object-lock storage an attacker with domain admin still cannot delete or encrypt.RTO and RPO you agreed
Designed around what the business can actually tolerate losing, then measured against it.Restore testing
Scheduled, documented restore tests. You learn your real recovery time in a drill, not an incident.Replication and DR
Warm standby and site replication for the systems that genuinely cannot wait for a restore.Monitored
Failed jobs surface as alerts to our SOC rather than sitting in an inbox nobody checks.No mystery about what happens next.
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Design
Map systems to tiers, agree RTO and RPO per tier, and design the topology to meet them.
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Build
Deploy the backup platform that fits your estate, including immutable and offsite targets.
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Prove
Run the first full restore drill together, document the real numbers, then repeat on schedule.
Start with a conversation, not a quote.
Thirty minutes with the engineer who would run this. You'll leave knowing whether it's the right thing to do first — even if the answer is no.